Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage
We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps driven by deleveraging, using a simple Keynesian model. When constrained agents engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained agents to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. However, if the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In such an environment, agents' exante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient. Welfare can be improved by ex-ante macroprudential policies such as debt limits and mandatory insurance requirements. The size of the required intervention depends on the differences in marginal propensity to consume between borrowers and lenders during the deleveraging episode. In our model, contractionary monetary policy is inferior to macroprudential policy in addressing excessive leverage, and it can even have the unintended consequence of increasing leverage.
50 pages, 4 editions
English edition · First published 2014 by International Monetary Fund · ISBN 9781498345507
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Editions
4 editions
English
- Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage · International Monetary Fund · 2014 · ISBN 9781498345507 This page
- Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage · International Monetary Fund · 2014 · ISBN 9781498356398
- Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage · International Monetary Fund · 2014 · ISBN 9781498370943
- Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage · International Monetary Fund · 2014 · ISBN 9781498358408
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