General MacArthur's Strategic Success During the Early Months of the Korean War
From 1945- 1950, the United States Army transitioned from a conventional force designed for maneuver warfare in Europe to a role, which supported the Air Force in their delivery of nuclear weapons. This secondary role emerged from strategic studies conducted by the National Security Council in response to President Truman's desire to focus military efforts against the communist East without bankrupting the nation. From this study, the National Security Council determined Communism as a threat to the free world, which triggered the start of a nuclear arms race. Determined that war would be won by the Air Force delivering nuclear weapons on targets, the Army became the bill payer at the expense of its modernization efforts. This reduction in funding limited the Army's ability to train at a collective level and forced the Army to use dated equipment from World War II. Consequently, Senior Army leaders put their faith in the advent of nuclear weapons and did not train their forces for other contingencies such as a limited war.
54 pages
English edition · First published 2014 by CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform · ISBN 9781501044588
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